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Abstract
In 1999, 905 Kosovar refugees settled in the province of
British Columbia (BC) in Canada. Despite their sudden
and forced departure, many have maintained contact
with and returned to visit Kosovo/a. We contend that
these transnational links are different for refugees than for
other classes of immigrants. In this case, “refugee transna-
tionalism” refers to the social, cultural, economic, and po-
litical relations that Kosovar refugees in Canada keep
with those in Serbia and Montenegro (formerly the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia). A salient feature that shapes
Kosovar transnationalism is the uncertain status of the re-
gion of origin, namely Kosovo/a. Based on interviews and
focus groups with Kosovars in seven BC cities, we discuss
the quality and distinctiveness of transnational links
among this refugee group and their implications for settle-
ment and integration in Canada.
Résumé
En 1999, 905 réfugiés kosovars se sont établis dans la pro-
vince de la Colombie-Britannique (C.-B.) au Canada.
En dépit de leur départ rapide et forcé, nombre d’entre
eux ont gardé contact avec le Kosovo/Kosova et y ont sé-
journé. Les auteures soutiennent que ces liens transnatio-
naux diffèrent selon qu’il s’agit de réfugiés ou d’autres
catégories d’immigrants. L’expression « transnationa-
lisme des réfugiés » réfère ici aux relations sociales, cultu-
relles, économiques et politiques que les réfugiés kosovars
au Canada conservent avec les réfugiés de Serbie et du
Monténégro (anciennement la République fédérale de
Yougoslavie). Le statut incertain de la région d’origine est
l’un des traits saillants à la base du transnationalisme ko-
sovar, soit le Kosovo/Kosova. À partir d’interviews et de
discussions menées avec des Kosovars dans sept villes de
la C.-B., les auteures étudient les spécificités et le carac-
tère distinct des liens transnationaux au sein de ce groupe
de réfugiés et les implications pour leur établissement et
leur intégration au Canada.
Resettlement to another country is often considered a“durable solution” to displacement and the endpointof the refugee experience. A refugee’s attachment to
her region of origin does not simply end, however, once she
arrives in a host society such as Canada. Achieving full
participation in Canadian society is a long-term process
influenced by events and expectations in the country of
origin as well as the host country. “Immigrants take actions,
make decisions, and develop subjectivities and identities
embedded in networks of relationships that connect them
simultaneously to two or more nation-states.”1 Transna-
tionalism recognizes that settlement and “integration” occur
within the context of two or more locations, and that (new)
identities are forged across this space. As such, settlement
and integration cannot be fully understood without consid-
eration of the ongoing social, political, and economic ties
that are developed and maintained across the borders of the
two states. Incorporating a transnational analysis recognizes
that refugees retain and develop multiple relationships both
within and between the sending and receiving countries.
Processes of immigrant integration and emerging social
cohesion in Canadian society may vary from large to small
urban centres, across immigrant classes, and within specific
immigrant groups.2
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This paper examines the quality and distinctiveness of
transnational links among Kosovars, a group that came to
Canada as refugees in 1999. We contend that transnation-
alism is different for refugees than for other classes of
immigrants, and note that the uncertain status of the
Kosovars’ region of origin, namely Kosovo/a, shapes tran-
snational relations as well as settlement and integration in
the province of British Columbia in Canada (BC).3 Far
from abandoning all ties with Kosovo/a, the Kosovars in-
terviewed have established a multitude of relationships and
identities that extend beyond Canadian borders. Our find-
ings suggest that the transnational linkages Kosovars in BC
maintain with Kosovo/a do not necessarily detract from
their “integration” in Canada. Continued uncertainty in
Kosovo/a may in fact hasten settlement in Canada.
Living Lives across Time and Space
“The word ‘immigrant’ evokes images of permanent rup-
ture, of the abandonment of old patterns of life and the
painful learning of a new culture and often a new language.”4
Although this conception  envisions migrants  as  moving
permanently from one bounded nation to another, others
favour an “approach to migration that accents the attach-
ments migrants maintain to families, communities, tradi-
tions and causes outside the boundaries of the nation-state
to which they have moved.”5 Since the late 1980s, re-
searchers have theorized the ethnic and cultural identities
and networks of economic, political, and cultural relations
that cross national borders and boundaries. Proponents of
transnationalism argue that settlement occurs within a con-
text that simultaneously connects immigrants and refugees
to multiple nation-states.6 Advances in transportation and
communications technologies, and their increased accessi-
bility, facilitate migration and improved communications.
Migrants develop relations and identities that are no longer
anchored in one country, but rather span both their country
of origin and country of resettlement.7
Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc define transna-
tionalism as “the processes by which immigrants forge and
sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together
their societies of origin and settlement.”8 Portes extends
this definition by arguing that transnational relations must
be recurring activities that cross national borders and in-
volve a significant number of people.9 This scale and inten-
sity of relations, Portes asserts, differentiates transnational
activities from those of earlier migrants.10 Critics of Portes,
including Al-Ali and Koser, contend that his insistence on
“a significant number of people engaged in sustained rela-
tions over time” as a prerequisite to transnational migra-
tion is too rigid.11
Transnational approaches to migration research must
fully consider the ways in which refugee transnationalism
may differ from that of immigrant transnationalism.12
Forced migration is distinct from voluntary migration in
the development of transnational relations.
[The] immediate concern of recent arrivals has been to try to
secure their positions in their new host countries. Few have yet
had time even to re-establish contacts with relatives and friends
left behind . . . far less become involved in transnational activi-
ties, even those as basic as sending remittances.13
Al-Ali et al. distinguish “transnational activities,” which may
include political, economic, social, and cultural activities at
multiple scales from the individual to the institutional, from
“transnational capabilities,” which recognize that the ability
to engage in transnational activities is dependent upon the
resources available to migrants.14 The ability to engage in
transnational activities in the “home” country may be nega-
tively affected by unemployment, financial instability, and
language barriers in the receiving country. This distinction
is a useful extension to ideas forwarded by Portes and Portes
et al., as it begins to take into consideration the actual ability
of people to engage in transnational activities.15 Portes’ re-
search has historically focused on economic, voluntary mi-
grants sending significant remittances.
Recently arrived refugees and immigrants, however, may
not be in a position to engage in transnational activities.
Sporadic remittances of money or gifts may represent the
beginnings of transnational activities and relations for re-
cent refugees who are struggling to establish themselves in
the host society. The emergence of transnational activities
will be affected by conditions within both the host and the
sending country, and can vary over time and space depend-
ing on the attitudes of home states, differences in current
status, and differences in conditions in home society.16
Although much of the transnational literature focuses on
economic activities, such as remittances, and political ac-
tivities, a few researchers have foregrounded social rela-
tions.17 Mountz and Wright, for example, explore the ways
in which transnational migration between San Augustan,
Oaxaca, and Poughkeepsie, New York, have altered the
social practices of Mexican migrants in Poughkeepsie and
their families in San Augustan.18 These authors show how
transnational migration transforms social practices both in
the sending and receiving countries. Although it is difficult
to examine social relations without considering economic
and political linkages, the least attention has been paid to
the establishment and implications of transnational social
practices.
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Research Approach
Our research draws upon forty individual interviews and
seven focus groups with Kosovar refugees, sponsors, and key
informants that were conducted between May 2002 and
March 2003, in seven BC communities: Chilliwack, Ab-
botsford, Kelowna, Vernon, Vancouver, Surrey, and
Burnaby. Approximately equal numbers of Kosovar men
and women, aged twenty-one to seventy-eight, participated
in this research. Because the English language ability of the
Kosovar participants varied from those who claimed fluency
in English to those with little ability to speak English, inter-
preters were provided during focus groups and individual
interviews. Using interpreters ensured people could respond
in the language with which they felt the most comfortable.
Although not generalizable, these findings expose the char-
acter and intensity of transnational processes among one
refugee  group and have implications for settlement and
integration.
The analysis of transnational relations and activities was
included as one part of a study examining the settlement of
Kosovar refugees who arrived in British Columbia during
the summer of 1999.19 Questions about transnational link-
ages were integrated into the research design to ascertain
how, if at all, the development of multiple and complex
linkages, be they economic, social, or political, affects the
settlement experiences of Kosovar refugees in British Co-
lumbia.
Heeding the criticisms of earlier studies of transnation-
alism, we posed questions related to transnational linkages
to all participants in our study. Portes, Guarnizo, and Lan-
dolt, and Portes, warn that transnational linkages are over-
drawn by sampling only on the dependent variable, i.e.
those who participate in transnational exchange.20 Hiebert
and Ley also caution against this methodological pitfall.21
In their statistically significant survey of Vancouver immi-
grants, they add an important dimension to research on
transnationalism: quantitative methods with arguably
more generalizable results. Including questions about tran-
snationalism on an interview schedule concerned primarily
with settlement in smaller cities allowed us to ascertain
whether transnationalism was relevant to the experiences
of the refugees contacted. In other words, our sample is not
skewed in favour of those for whom transnationalism is
already important.
Distinguishing “Refugee Transnationalism”
Portes characterizes transnationalism as the formation of
dense networks across political borders created by immigrants
in their quest for economic advancement and social recogni-
tion. Through these networks, an increasing number of people
are able to live dual lives. Participants are often bilingual, move
easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in
two centres, and pursue economic, political and cultural inter-
ests that require their presence in both.22
In the Canadian context, Hiebert and Ley found higher
incidences of transnationalism among economic and fam-
ily-class immigrants than among refugees.23 Unlike mi-
grants, who have prepared themselves to begin their lives in
a new country, refugees have been forced to flee their homes
and their country.24 As such, they may lack the financial
resources and social networks that would hasten their inte-
gration. The majority of Kosovars interviewed, for example,
would not meet the conditions outlined by Portes: few spoke
English upon arrival in Canada, and most Kosovars inter-
viewed continue to find it difficult to move between coun-
tries for both economic and political reasons.
Unemployment and underemployment, the high cost of
travel to Kosovo/a, and lack of travel documents curtail the
potential for people to travel directly to Kosovo/a or to make
frequent returns.25 Unlike the experiences of Bosnian and
Eritrean refugees in the UK and the Netherlands, however,
the Kosovars could not rely on pre-existing networks estab-
lished by earlier labour migrants as there were few Kosovars
living in BC prior to 1999.26 Limited financial resources and
political instability impair the ability of Kosovars to move
freely between their country of origin and the host country.
Their situation raises the question of whether “migrant
transnationalism” should be differentiated from that of
“refugee transnationalism.”
Most immigrants and refugees who successfully apply to
come to Canada have upwards of a year to prepare for their
journey. Given efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo/a by the
Milosevic regime, the Kosovars had little time to prepare
for their departure.27 Research undertaken in Alberta found
that the average time between when Kosovars left their
homes in Kosovo/a and their arrival in Canada was fifty-
two days, compared to five years for non-Kosovar partici-
pants  in the  study.28 “Refugee transnationalism” differs
markedly from that of other immigrant classes because
refugees are forced to leave their homes, often with little
notice.
In employing the term “refugee transnationalism” we
recognize that competing discourses are embedded within
the concept. “Refugee” is a political and legal category
framed by “international” discourse focused on the relation
of nation-states to one another. Refugees are outside the
borders of their country, and are unable or unwilling to
avail themselves of protection from their government. The
idea of “refugee transnationalism,” however, reframes the
category “refugee” as simultaneously embedded within
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both the country of origin and the host society to consider
the ways in which refugees develop identities and form
ongoing relationships. In this way the state is decentred as
the only scale of analysis, but remains an important consid-
eration in determining prospects for return.
Refugees have different motivations and resources avail-
able to them than do other migrants who may form tran-
snational networks in a “quest for economic advancement
and social recognition.”29 As such their relationships differ
significantly from those of migrants who are socially and
financially prepared to leave. Unlike many asylum seekers
whose immediate concerns are to establish themselves in
their host country, the Kosovars benefited from being
granted immediate recognition as refugees and their legal
status as landed immigrants.30 In this respect, the experi-
ences of Kosovars differed from those of the Bosnians and
Eritreans in England who expressed “concern and insecu-
rity with respect to their legal status.”31 In contrast, the
Kosovars’ position in Canada is more certain than that in
Kosovo/a. The war in Kosovo/a has not ended in the for-
mation of an independent state, as it did for Bosnians and
Eritreans, but rather in a “proto-independence” as a tem-
porary UN protectorate.32
The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of June 10,
1999, led to the establishment of the UN mission in Kosovo,
UNMIK; the resolution established a transitional admini-
stration but with no clear end status for Kosovo.33 The pre-
amble of the resolution reaffirms the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
over Kosovo; it calls for “self-administration” and “sub-
stantial autonomy,” but not a separate state. This stands in
clear contrast, for example, with Security Council Resolu-
tion 1272 for East Timor, which clearly stated that the aim
of the UN transitional administration was to be a transition
to an independent East Timor.34 The effect of this resolu-
tion, in conjunction with political developments in Serbia
and Montenegro (especially the removal of Slobodan
Milosevic as President), has served to heighten political
uncertainty.
The character of this UN resolution has shaped
Kosovo/a’s indeterminate political status. That is, Kosovar
identification with Canada is not solely a product of the
indigenous politics of Serbia and Montenegro. UN man-
dates and multilateral interventions into Kosovo have also
played a part in shaping these transnational relationships,
albeit indirectly. In a sense, multilateral political relations
among states and areas affected by conflict and ethnic
cleansing shape transnational identity formation among
displaced Kosovars now living in BC. The continued pres-
ence of the international peacekeeping Kosovo Force
(KFOR) and the uncertain political fate of Kosovo/a (i.e. as
a province of Serbia or an independent state) prolong this
uncertainty and hasten settlement in Canada. “Home” is
marked with uncertainty about the political future.
Rebuilding Kosovo/a requires considerable investment,
but several respondents felt it was impossible until there
was political stability in the region and clarity on its status.
For one person, questions of citizenship are complicated by
political uncertainty in Kosovo/a.
There is a real need in Kosovo for people who can help rebuild
the economy, but the political status of Kosovo has not changed
yet. So, you can’t really rebuild an economy without an ade-
quate solution to the political issues because you don’t have the
security for investment. Just recently there were elections for the
parliament . . . They say the president of Kosovo, but the presi-
dent of what? President of the municipality or . . . what is it? So
without that the economy will never move forward.35
For the past four years, “Kosovo has existed in a constitu-
tional limbo . . . At issue is whether the province will become
independent or remain part of Serbia. The Kosovo Albani-
ans want independence; the Serbs oppose it.”36 Initial talks
between Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian government and Serb-
led government were held on October 14, 2003, in Vienna.37
The continued political uncertainty has had economic con-
sequences:
Nobody will put money in because they have no guarantee that
the incoming government will not confiscate their investment.
This has condemned the province to a commercial life that
today consists of smuggling, subsistence farming and high un-
employment.38
In July 2003, for example, the unemployment rate in
Kosovo/a was estimated at 57 per cent.39 For one person who
is going to school to upgrade previous qualifications, the job
opportunities in Kosovo/a are scarce:
There is not too many opportunities over there because the war
happened and everything is destroyed and lots of houses were
burnt and factories. We don’t have one factory over there that
is working right now.
Ongoing political uncertainty in Kosovo/a precludes the
likelihood of a rapid solution to its economic crisis. “Fac-
tories lie dormant with little hope of investment. The UN
says it must tackle standards before it can tackle Kosovo’s
final status. But without status, no-one knows what they are
investing their money in.”40 Reflecting on a return visit to
Kosovo/a, one informant noted “it was good to see family
again, but the country was devastated.” Talk about return
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is mitigated by the current devastation in Kosovo/a. Wide-
spread unemployment and the absence of health care facili-
ties make return much less desirable. The majority of
Kosovars interviewed do not foresee a future there, at least
in the immediate few years. One respondent noted:
I am used to living with problems for last ten years, but I have
chance when Kosova get freedom I am sure I will find job then.
Company called many times because you need to come we don’t
have like you, but I think when I came to Canada I would try to
stay in Canada. I have no house now [in Kosovo/a]. I have nothing,
and I know Kosova remain in bad situation for a long time.
Although this person is not ruling out an eventual return to
Kosovo/a, the current conditions prohibit immediate re-
turn. Life in Canada, despite unemployment for many, of-
fers more possibilities than in Kosovo/a.41
Place and the Importance of Networks
Three years after their arrival in Canada, all of the Kosovars
interviewed maintain ongoing contact with family and
friends in Kosovo/a on a weekly, and in many cases a daily,
basis. Communication is mainly by phone and mail, al-
though electronic means of exchange, such as e-mail and
Internet messaging services, have been important for
Kosovars in major urban centres, particularly Vancouver.
Similarly, Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in the UK, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands engage in regular contact with
family in their respective home countries, primarily by
phone, although a small number of Bosnians reported using
the Internet.42 In addition to phone calls and letters, the
Internet has been an important news source that has enabled
Kosovars to stay abreast of daily events in Kosovo/a.
Kosovars interviewed in Vancouver, in particular, regularly
use computers (as do others in Kelowna, Chilliwack, Ab-
botsford, and Surrey as well). One Kosovar stated,
Through Internet is everything available. You can search any-
thing you want—radio, TV, theatres, political situation, econ-
omy, everything. Also there is phone calls, through talking to
people and messenger. They will tell us what’s new, what’s good,
what’s bad.
Weekly Internet newspapers and on-line news agencies that
are published in Albanian have allowed the Kosovars to
monitor current events. In Vernon, where the Kosovars we
interviewed were not computer literate, the employment
counsellor at the local immigrant and refugee-serving
agency would print out the weekly on-line newspaper for
them. The Albanian-speaking Kosovar diaspora spans the
globe, the dispersion being primarily a result of the 1999
exodus. When asked if he kept in contact with people in
Kosovo/a, one Kosovar in Vancouver stated:
Every day and every night. Homesick all the time . . . Usually
first we start with phones, but usually now with the Internet.
Every day. Like we have . . . [a] specified time where we meet
each other. We waiting each other to contact . . . It’s amazing
some of the things that keep me here because I can feel it. I’m
many times, I play some music and Albanian music, with all
kind of actors and singers and stuff. That’s keeping me really . . .
healthful. It keeps me all the time in life. Like . . . I can make
utmost for life. I am home.
“Home” then is not bounded by the borders of one province
or country but simultaneously exists across the borders of
both Kosovo/a and Canada. Even as they struggle to build
new lives in Canada, many Kosovars maintain ongoing
linkages with Kosovo/a. Over time, however, some Kosovars
indicated they have begun to look at the news less frequently
than they did three years earlier when they first arrived.
[I] used to [keep up with the news], but not anymore . . .
[Unless] someone mentions something . . . I don’t usually
search for news.
Similarly, Hiebert and Ley found the length of settlement is
important in the maintenance of transnational relations and
activities, with recent immigrants more likely to maintain
contact with friends and family in the country of origin.43
Settlement requires establishing new livelihoods in a new
location and often in a different language.
Migration and settlement force people to negotiate new
identities which are not bounded by the borders of a single
nation-state. How are these evolving transnational identi-
ties important in relation to participation in Canadian
society? Like the Bosnians studied by Al-Ali et al., “being
Kosovar” “governs many people’s sense of identity and
sense  of belonging.”44 In spite of  their  commitment  to
obtaining Canadian citizenship, respondents confirmed
having multiple identities.
In Canada I identify myself as an Albanian . . . but I . . . stopped in
Austria on the way . . . [to visit] Kosova, and I leaned more towards
identifying myself as a Canadian there . . . I’m not sure [why],
maybe just the politics that’s been going on there . . . [inter-
viewer—maybe it felt safer] . . . safe . . . not much safer, but I don’t
know, sometimes we’re embarrassed too. Because not everyone
understands. You know, they judge you by that thing.
Identity is relational, especially with regard to place. One
woman who originally settled in the United States suggested:
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Actually I feel more American than Albanian [be]cause I miss
more New York than my country . . . My family is there and I
[have] lots of friends in New York . . . and I haven’t been to
Kosova in three years . . . Where the family is, the heart is.
One Kosovar suggested the passing of time in Canada could
change his/her identity.
I have . . . a lot of contact with people [from Kosovo/a that have
been] here fifteen years . . . [When] I say I am from Kosovo, they
say, I was saying that but now I saying now Vancouver is my
home, or Canada is my home . . . Probably what is true if I am
staying here fifteen years, twenty years then it’s different, then
lose all contacts with my people back home and probably then,
after ten, fifteen years I belong, I am from here, but it’s difficult
to adjust right now.
For another person, Canadian citizenship is imagined as
being a new aspect of their identity as Kosovar.
[I am a] Kosovar but [I am a] landed immigrant in Canada.
That is that. But when I think of myself I am Kosovar. And I’m
going to be . . . [as long as] I’m alive. Even if I get Canadian
citizenship . . . I am citizen of Canada . . . and I really appreciate
that. But I’m still Albanian . . . , Kosovar from Kosova.
Integration into Canadian society, then, is imagined as “be-
coming Canadian” while still maintaining Kosovar identity
and culture.45 Becoming Canadian, then, represents a facet
of a continuously emerging identity. Another person talked
about increasingly feeling like he had a home in both
Kosovo/a and Canada.
If I was born here, maybe [it] would be different . . . but I was
born over there . . . So it’s hard for me to say . . . I’m Canadian
yet. But I feel like . . . I have home here too . . . When I went [to
Kosovo/a] for two months last year. It was kind of pushing me
sometimes to go back there. Pulling me to come over here . . . I
see myself like fifty-fifty.
The establishment and maintenance of transnational social
relations reconceptualizes notions of “home” (as stretching
across space) and encourages the renegotiation of identity,
both an individual and a culturally distinct group that shares
a language.
In order to avoid the necessity of starting over, one family
has elected to take advantage of a provision within Canada’s
Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP) that enables stu-
dents to travel back to the country of origin. This enables
the  couple to  travel “back and forth to  school without
stopping their landing in Canada.” As such, this family lives
in Kosovo/a during the school year and then in Canada
during summer breaks. Despite feelings of indifference
towards Kosovo/a, dividing time between the two countries
has distinct personal advantages for this family: continued
progress towards professional accreditation in Kosovo/a
(after which the person intends to write qualifying exams
in Canada), and continued progress towards obtaining Ca-
nadian citizenship. The  degree to  which Kosovars  have
developed transnational social relations and identities var-
ies significantly, however, within the population inter-
viewed. Evidence does point to the existence of tight
transnational social networks among the Kosovars inter-
viewed. Interest in news “back home” has waned for some
and may well decline further over time.46 Although only
one person talked about being in contact with Kosovars in
other Canadian cities, there appears to be a rich network of
information concerning living and employment conditions
in these cities.
Transnational Capacities
As they negotiate settlement in Canada, many of the
Kosovars interviewed expressed the desire to help family
members still living in Kosovo/a by sending money. Unem-
ployment and underemployment, as well as the high costs
of living in BC, however, have prevented many of the
Kosovars from sending regular remittances. These findings
differ significantly from those of Al-Ali et al. who reported
that the majority of Bosnians and Eritreans they interviewed
were sending regular remittances to family and friends in
Bosnia and Eritrea.47 The perceived obligation to send money
to help with daily living expenses in Kosovo/a has required
some Kosovars to make personal sacrifices here in Canada.
[W]e have like obligation to help them. Doesn’t matter if I am
suffering here, we have that respect and need to help them . . .
My family . . . is suffering. We need to . . . help them. We have
that responsibility. [It] doesn’t matter how. You working hard
here or you don’t have [money] to go to spend . . . You need to
have money [to send home].
Men, in particular, expressed a social obligation to help
support parents in Kosovo/a.
Usually parents . . . choose one of the children [and] he have
responsibility to support them and to live with them to the end.
The sacrifices made to help those in Kosovo/a obviously
shape the social activities Kosovars can participate in here in
Canada. In their work with Bosnian refugees, Al-Ali et al.
found “[t]hose with additional income . . . are often faced
with a choice between saving money to return, supporting
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their family in Bosnia, or starting to build a new life in the
host country.”48 Nonetheless, family and friends are in their
thoughts; the stress of trying to make ends meet in BC is
compounded by the acute housing and income needs of
those left behind.
Currently, only three families out of twenty-four send
semi-regular remittances of $500 to $1,000 every three to
six months to family and friends living in Kosovo/a. Many
of the Kosovars interviewed indicated they send sporadic
gifts of money or clothes because they are not in a position
to send regular remittances.49
I send [gifts to] . . . my brother and sister . . . Sometimes I wish
I could send more, but now [there is] . . . not enough for me
here.
The inability to send regular remittances to Kosovo/a in-
creases the stress of settlement in Canada.
Like $20 or $50 dollars just to say hi, and that I don’t forget you.
It is not big money . . . I have my uncle [and] my cousin . . . their
houses were burnt and for winter they don’t have a house. They
sleep in a tent and the winter it is minus 25 or minus 30
sometimes. These poor people have nothing. No roof, no house,
no nothing: they sleep outside . . . I cannot help them even if I
want [to]. It is very hard and sad.
Remittances that are sent to friends and family living in
Kosovo/a are delivered through informal networks as op-
posed to through formal transfer systems, such as Western
Union. As people return for visits, others will send money
or gifts for friends and family in Kosovo/a.
Keeping Options Open
Questions about the desire of Kosovars to obtain Canadian
citizenship as they become eligible were posed. Although the
Kosovars interviewed are at differing stages of their eligibil-
ity (some were not eligible to apply while others had already
applied at the time of the interview), they were unanimous
about their intention to have Canadian citizenship: it offers
security and facilitates mobility. Speaking of a Canadian
passport, one respondent noted:
[I] want it so I can visit Kosova, currently [I] can’t without lots
of visas, and [we are] prohibited from travel in Yugoslavia, [but
I] want to travel to Kosova.
Upon receiving Canadian citizenship, one family repatriated
to Kosovo/a to rebuild their lives. Canadian citizenship, in
this example, acts as a form of insurance: if this family can
not forge a livelihood upon their return to Kosovo/a, they
may choose to return to Canada.50 Kosovars “[k]eep their
options open” by maintaining access to multiple nation-
states and thus increasing stability and security.51 This raises
interesting questions about whether other people will return
to Kosovo/a after obtaining their Canadian citizenship and,
in turn, what kind of citizens they will become in relation to
Canadian society.52 While beyond the scope of this paper,
this issue has been widely addressed among economic im-
migrants to Canada, but not among refugees.53
Formal political involvement in Kosovo/a, through vot-
ing, is highly variable among the Kosovars interviewed.54
Although only five Kosovars out of thirty-four indicated
that they had voted in the 2002 elections in Kosovo/a, over
50 per cent of the Kosovars interviewed say they intend to
vote in future Kosovar elections.55 Approximately 30 per
cent of the Kosovars interviewed, however, have no inten-
tion of voting in Kosovo/a in the future. Reflecting on his
knowledge of local issues and candidates at home in
Kosovo/a, one Kosovar reasoned, “I don’t know most of the
people who are running . . . my vote would be [an] unedu-
cated one.” Geography also played a role in the decision
whether or not to vote in Kosovar elections: “I’m here now
and probably will not vote.” One Kosovar related his par-
ent’s inability to vote in Kosovo/a as they lack updated
documentation to prove they are citizens of Kosovo/a:
I can [vote] but my parents cannot . . . because they didn’t have
updated information . . . It is really very frustrating there trying
to get all the information that you lived there but the thing is
that you cannot because everything is destroyed.
Judah reports that as the Kosovars fled,
the police stripped most refugees of their documents . . . [I]n
this way Milosevic may have hoped to make it impossible for
them to come home later as they would have no way of proving
that they were Yugoslav, as opposed to Albanian or Macedonian
citizens.56
These factors increase the difficulty of proving former Yu-
goslavian citizenship and problematize voting prospects. In
contrast, all of those who apply for Canadian citizenship are
likely to get it. While voting is not an arduous level of
political participation, it does signal the Kosovars’ priorities
and intentions to vote in Canada. Connections to Canada
already appear stronger on some counts.
Conclusion: Constitutive Outsides
Settlement and integration occur within the context of a
nexus of social, political, and economic relations that simul-
taneously connect immigrants and refugees to multiple na-
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tion-states. Unlike many asylum seekers and refugees with
temporary status, whose immediate energies are focused on
obtaining status in the host country, the Kosovars in Canada
benefited significantly from being granted immediate recog-
nition, legal status, and basic support. For the Kosovars,
their status in Canada is far more certain than it is in Serbia
and Montenegro.
Continued political and economic uncertainty in
Kosovo/a is due in part to the nature of the UN resolution
which authorized multilateral intervention in Kosovo/a.
Kosovo/a’s future remains uncertain, and this appears to
have the effect of hastening settlement in Canada for
Kosovar refugees. The inability to foresee a future at
“home” in Kosovo/a in the next five to ten years has meant
that Kosovars in Canada plan to stay and have begun to
establish a future for themselves. “Home” in Kosovo/a is
marked with an uncertain economic and political future.
For some, Canadian citizenship offers security and a new
beginning in a new country. For others it offers mobility
and the opportunity to visit Kosovo/a without restrictions,
but with an “insurance policy” of return to Canada. For
most, Canada offers better economic and political pros-
pects than Kosovo/a, at least in the medium term. The
transnational ties, identities, and relationships forged be-
tween Kosovo/a and British Columbia shape the daily lives
of the Kosovars in BC. The establishment and maintenance
of transnational relations has resulted in a reconstitution of
“home” for the Kosovars interviewed. “Home” is a social
field that straddles the borders of both BC and Kosovo/a.
The transnational identities and relationships developed
between Kosovo/a and Canada, and among members of the
diaspora, are an expression of extant social networks with
family and friends. While modest, these networks are also
the spaces in which remittances and gifts circulate. In BC,
ample  evidence points to  the existence of transnational
information networks. Our methods allowed us to docu-
ment transnational “traffic” but not to measure whether
this “traffic” wanes  over time  as integration in Canada
proceeds.
While we cannot definitively prove that transnational-
ism augments settlement and integration in the Canadian
context, neither did we  find evidence to suggest that it
detracts from participation in BC and Canadian society.
Indeed, the uncertain political status in Kosovo/a appears
to act as a “constitutive outside,” constituting Kosovars as
Canadian to a greater extent because their status in Serbia
and Montenegro is uncertain and unattractive.57 Nonethe-
less, attachments and belonging to more than one place
makes “home” difficult to define. Even as he plans a future
for his family in Canada, one Kosovar lamented:
I’m Albanian. Born Albanian, and Albanian I’ll die. My heart is
there . . . I have no way of helping them in any way, but . . . that’s
my country and that’s my homeland.
In the absence of political stability and economic security in
Kosovo/a in the foreseeable future, a home in Canada offers
more certainty and opportunities to the Kosovars.
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